Professor Hagerman’s book, which I will refer
to as “The Civil War and Modern Warfare”, is a thorough study of the science
and art of warfare. The book traces the development of American military
thought in the decades prior to the 1860, and it completely examines changes
in strategic and tactical operations forced on commanders by developing
technology and North American terrain. The Civil War and Modern Warfare
is about the business of waging war, about how the rifled musket affected
the tactics employed, about how maneuver was affected by supply limitations,
and about how organization and communications affected the final outcome.
Hagerman sets the tone of his work in the introduction when he points out
that, “The American soldier was not ready for the challenges that would
push him over what might be called the critical threshold of modern land
warfare. In theory and doctrine the United States followed the lead of
France, and there was no reason before the Civil War to question the prestige
of the Napoleonic tradition.” That tradition would linger, but as Hagerman
states in his opening, the rifled musket and “transportation and supply
system(s) responsive to the demands of American geography” would compel
commanders to turn from eighteenth century models to new standards - the
foundations of modern war. For example, Hagerman establishes a reasonable
link between Sherman’s 1864-65 logistical operations and those of the World
War II German armies’ horse drawn trains almost eighty years later.
This book provides a thought provoking chronicle of the evolution of tactical
and strategic systems in both major theaters of the war. The author demonstrates
how McClellan’s ability to maneuver on the offensive was inhibited by logistical
demands, and how Lee suffered the same fate when he moved to the attack.
Hagerman discusses Federal experiments with the flying column concept and
growing pains in the telegraphic service. On the Confederate side he studies
the adverse affects of poor railroad policy and the innovative organization
of field artillery.
I set aside the greatest praise for Professor Hagerman’s reserve and tone
throughout the book. He evaluates, he compares, and he draws reasonable,
thoughtful conclusions without second-guessing or over judging. These last
two traits are, in my opinion, far too common in too many books about the
Civil War. One reads the word “blunder”- a gross error resulting from stupidity,
ignorance, or carelessness - quite often in works written by people who
I suspect could not lead a squad across a parking lot much less guide an
army spread out over many square miles of field and forest.
In fact, The Civil War and Modern Warfare effectively conveys war as a
many-faceted puzzle with which commanders must grope for solutions in semi-darkness
and fog. As Bob Jones, designer of the war game “Piquet”, wrote, “ ...
as the battle progressed the commander’s view often degraded, not only
by vision blocking smoke , but battle confusion, and command infrastructure
failure, making accurate tactical assessments and adjustments more difficult.
Much of the capability of good commanders (is) in (the) art of estimating,
not knowing, the enemy’s intentions, quality, and likely actions.”
Hagerman shows that Northern and Southern commanders had to unlearn much
of what they were taught at West Point and practiced in Mexico. Men who
as young officers became masters of the direct assault and of offensive
artillery were forced through hard and bloody experience a generation later
to become masters of field entrenchment. Although the author occasionally
speculates on individual character or motivation he makes no attempt to
psychoanalyze the commanders he writes about. Instead, he examines their
actions as those of military professionals with missions, objectives, and
strategies, and he tries to determine why they did or did not succeed.
I do not agree with all of Hagerman’s conclusions. He writes in Chapter
4, Elan and Organization, that, “... Lee took longer to learn from his
experience that the frontal assault contributed only to attrition without
victory than any other field commander in the Civil War.” I do not think
this stands up if Grant’s attacks at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, Sherman’s
at Pickett’s Mill and Kennesaw Mountain, and Hood’s at Franklin (to name
but three) are considered. I also disagree with the author’s depiction
of Jackson’s overall tactical integrity. Hagerman creates the impression
that Stonewall’s dispositions were judicious and that he maintained good
command communications through the use of his staff. This was very often
not true, at least through the Battle of Cedar Mountain. Jackson’s subordinates
many times did not know where they were going or what they were supposed
to do. At Kernstown, Port Republic, and Cedar Mountain, Jackson’s incomplete
tactical arrangements caused problems.
The Civil War and Modern Warfare is my kind of military history. Without
being dry or dull Hagerman’s style dispenses with much of the baggage loaded
into “popular” histories leaving the reader with a truer understanding
of the combat operations of the Civil War. In my opinion, every living
historian or student of the war would benefit from reading this book.
Note: I realize that works like that reviewed above may not be to everyone’s
taste, so my next review will cover a short book describing how Abner Doubleday
and Ambrose Burnside tried to sleep on the same gum blanket and invented
“Twister”.
